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Summary
The subject of this thesis is the relationship between administrative supervision,
criminal investigation and the nerrlo-tenetur principle. The point of departure is
the distinction made in Dutch law and doctrine between administrative supervi-
sion and criminal investigation. Such a distinction is often made in the area of
the enforcement of socio-economic regulatory legislation where supervision and
investigation are perceived as (isolated) phases of the regulatory process. The
supervision phase gives way to the investigation phase as soon as a suspicion that
a criminal offence has been committed arises. Initially, one of the main argu-
ments in favour of the distinction seems to have been that a citizen's obligation
to provide information to the supervising authorities, conflicts with a suspect's
right to remain silent during the investigation phase. Therefore, the central ques-
tion that the study seeks to answer reads as follows:
ls it necessary to have a strict demarcation between administrstive supervision and
criminal investigation in order to (better) respect the nemo-tenetur pinciple?
The research based on this question is developed in Chapters z to 6 after a brief
introduction in Chapter r. In answering the central question, the approach cho-
sen is to see how the nemo-tenetur principle operates in another legal system
where "the Dutch distinction" is absent.
Chapter z describes the discussion around the distinction between supervi-
sion and investigation in the Netherlands. However, it does not aim at a detailed
description of the whole discussion. Instead, the main purpose of Chapter z is to
illustrate the inconsistencies of the prevailing Dutch doctrine on the topic of su-
pervision and investigation and to further explain the central question of this
book. In this approach, the main issues addressed in Chapter z may be summa-
rised as follows. The roots of the distinction made between supervision and in-
vestigation seem to be found in the relationship between Administrative and
Criminal Law, which had different developmental trajectories through the years.
Therefore, those two areas of public law are very often seen as two separated
fields. One of the consequences of the demarcation between Administrative and
Criminal Law is that there is also a distinction made between criminal investiga-
tion and administrative supervision (or control). According to the prevailing doc-
trine the distinguishing criterion is the rise of a suspicion that a criminal offence
has been committed. This is also the moment when the Criminal Procedure be-
gins. Whatever happens before that moment has nothing to do with Criminal
Procedure and is mainly regulated by Administrative Law. The doctrine seems to
have been followed by the legislator, who, since the beginning of the 7o's, has
continuously made a sharp distinction between the task of supervision and the
task of investigation on the one hand and the powers attached to those tasks on
the other. However, the distinction has not always been consistent and well func-
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tioning. The research project "Strafvorderirug 2oo7", whose goal was to come up
with proposals for the drafting of a new Code of Criminal Procedure, has identi-
fied most of the inconsistencies of the legislation with the prevailing doctrine and
the malfunctioning of the distinction.' For example, forms of enquiries such as
proactive investigation, repressive control and'WED investigations are difficult to be
placed within the framework of the prevailing doctrine.
The regulation of financial markets in the Netherlands, where a sharp distinc-
tion is made between Administrative and Criminal Law, provides a good illustra-
tion of those inconsistencies. Dutch financial markets are supervised by a self-
standing administrative organ, Autodteit-Financiele Markten, which derives its
controlling powers indirectly from the Awb., On the other hand the machinery of
criminal law plays an important role as well. The supervisor of the financial mar-
kets has little influence in the criminal law procedure since it operates only
within the sphere of administrative law and because it does not have the power to
prosecute. Criminal investigations are conducted by the FIOD-ECD (a so-called
extraordinary investigation agenry/service) under the supervision of the Public
Prosecutor. The distinction criterion is again the rise of a suspicion that a crimi-
nal offence has been committed. After a brief description of the supervision and
enforcement procedures, it is sought to "touch" the inconsistencies of the prevail-
ing doctrine by means of hypothetical scenarios in the field of the regulation of
financial markets in the Netherlands. The main conclusion is that the distinction
made between control and investigation is on many points unclear and dysfunc-
tional. However, it is believed that such a distinction is needed because, among
other things, it contributes to the balance between the obligation to provide in-
formation and the nemo-tenetur principle. The question is though, whether a
strict distinction between control and investigation provides for a satisfactory
solution of this problem.
As mentioned above, the approach chosen is to see how the nemo-tenetur prin-
ciple operates in another legal system where "the Dutch distinction" is absent. In
this approach, it is first necessary to identify the factors which may have an im-
pact on the proper operation o{ the nemo-tenetur principle. This is done in Chap-
ter 3 of the book, which analyses the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights on the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence, inher-
ent in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 6 of the
Convention applies to cases which involve the determination of a criminal
charge. The Court has given an autonomous meaning to the term "criminal
charge" and has developed three criteria on the basis of which it can test the ap-
plicability of Article 6 ECHR to a particular criminal case. Accordingly, the Court
looks at the classification of the concerned offence under national law. the nature
See G. Knigge & N.J.M. Kwakman, "Het opsporingsbegrip en de normering van de opspo-
ringstaak" in M.S. Groenhuijsen en G. Knigge (red.\, Hetvooronderzoek in strafzaken. Twee-
de inteimrappot't onderzoeksproject Strafvordering zoot (Deventer: Gouda Quint zoor), p.
z8o-3oo.
See Chapter z at 4.)r.r .
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ofthat offence and the character and severity ofthe penalty that the person con-
cerned risks incurring.:
The European Court of Human Rights has had to deal in various occasions
with the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. Despite the
casuistic approach of the Court, it can be concluded that there are certain matters
which can be regarded as "sensitive" with respect o the proper functioning of the
nenxo-tenetur p inciple. For example, compelled statements made during an ad-
ministrative investigation whose purpose is r.oi the determination of a "criminal
charge", do not in itself violate the immunities of Article 6 ECHR. It is the use of
such statements against their maker in criminal proceedings which could in-
fringe the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence.a Moreover,
compelled information which has an existence independent from the will of the
accused does not affect the proper operation of the nemo-tenetur principle. In this
context, compelling a suspect/accused, on pain of punishment, to provide poten-
tial incriminating documentary evidence does not in itself constitute a violation
of the immunities of Article 6 ECHR. However, a breach may occur if the au-
thorities are seeking to obtain documentary evidence in a speculative way.s The
degree of compulsion faced by a person charged with a criminal offence is also
an important factor in the operation of the nemo-tenetur principle. The Court does
not consider the immunities of Article 6 ECHR as being absolute and not any
kind of compulsion is enough to secure a violation of the immunities.6 However,
a choice between giving information and facing the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions is a genuine example of a high degree of compulsion that threatens the
proper functioning of lhe nemo-tenetwr p inciple.z
An account on the possible rationales behind Ihe nemo-tenetur principle con-
cludes Chapter 3. Accordingly, one can distinguish three rationales behind the
immunities of Article 6 ECHR. The first one is related to the (un)reliability of
evidence obtained through improper compulsion. This view puts ihe accent on
the importance of the objective truth-finding and the avoidance of miscarriages of
justice. A second rationale concerns the unacceptable physical or psychological
pressure, which presupposes respect for human dignity and which protects the
suspects under custodial police questioning against such pressure. The third
rationale goes further and suggests that the suspect should also be entirely free to
decide its own position throughout the whole criminal proceedings.
The regulation of financial services in England, described in Chapter 4, pro-
vides for a legai system where no sharp distinction is made between administra-
tive supervision and criminal investigation. English financial services are super-
vised by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which has extensive compelling
information gathering and investigation powers. A statement made to an FSA
investigator by a person in compliance with an information requirement may not
be adduced in evidence by or on behalf of the prosecution in criminal proceed-
) Engel and Others v. The Netherlands (o81o61ry76).
a Saunders v. the United Kingdom g7 ltzlry96l.
, Funkev. France (z5lozlt99l; J.B.v. Switzerland \qloSlzoot\.
s lohn Munay v. the united Kingdom (o8/oz11996).
7 Heaney and. McGuinness v. Ireland. (zt ltz lzooo\.
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ings in which that person is charged with an offence. Moreover, the FSA can also
impose a range of sanctions varying from disciplinary sanctions to the imposition
of penalties for market abuse. The FSA has also the power to prosecute certain
criminal offences. A1l these powers constitute the so-called "regulatory toolkit".
Supervision of firms, investigations, enforcement and discipline are, among
other things, part of the "regulatory toolkit". However, they are not isolated
phases of the regulatory process. They interact and sometimes overlap with each
other. [n other words, they are all alternative tools available to the FSA for the
purposes of meeting the regulatory objectives. The information gathering and
investigation powers are also considered as alternative fact-finding powers and
there is no distinctive criterion, such as reasonable suspicion, which separates or
isolates information gathering powers from investigation powers. Moreover, the
enquiries which precede the imposition of sanctions or prosecution are not di-
vided into phases. It is just one big (or small) enquiry where, in theory at least, all
the fact-findlng powers may be deployed altematively. Furthermore, the supervi-
sory and investigatory tasks of the FSA do not directly aim at the imposition of
sanctions. An enquiry may eventually result either in the imposition of a (puni-
tive) penalty/sanction or prosecution. Persons who do not agree with FSA s deci-
sions, such as the imposition of a penalty or a disciplinary measure, may refer the
matter to the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal where the FSA has to
prove its case.
Chapter 5 contains an account on the English law of criminal evidence. The
main purpose is to see how compelled information obtained by the FSA from the
accused/suspect may reach criminal courts in the form of evidence. The golden
rule is that evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant; irrelevant evidence is
inadmissible. Relevant evidence is not automatically admissible. Relevanry is a
necessary prerequisite for the admissibility of evidence, but it is not the only one.
Another second hurdle that must be past is that of exclusionary rules. Most of the
English law of evidence consists of exclusionary rules which may render relevant
evidence inadmissible. One of them is the privilege against self-incrimination.
Compelled statements made to the FSA during an investigation may not be used
against their maker in criminal proceedings. Following the English pattern of
thought, this exclusionary rule is seen as respecting the privilege against self-
incrimination. The rule against hearsay evidence is probably the most important
and controversial exclusionary rule of the English criminal evidence. According
to that rule only in-court statements, thus statements made by a witness testify-
ing from the witness box are admissible evidence. Out-of-court statements are
hearsay statements and therefore inadmissible evidence. The accused may not be
compelled to testify in his trial, thus any statement that he made outside the
court room (e.g., during investigations) is in principle hearsay evidence. How-
ever, there are a number of exceptions to the rule against hearsay evidence. One
of them concerns out-ofcourt statements of the accused, which are treated as
confessions and are admissible evidence if the prosecution proves beyond rea-
sonable doubt that a confession was not obtained by oppression or that there was
nothine said or done which rendered the confession unreliable. Therefore, the
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FSA may adduce in evidence any out-of-court statements of the accused (except
compelled statements made to investigators which are inadmissible) if it proves
beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained by oppression or
that there was nothing said or done which rendered the confession unreliable.
Admissibility of business documents - which by definition contain out-of-court
statements - constitutes another exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
The FSA may thus adduce in evidence business documents by way of exception
to the rule against hearsay evidence. However, a confession which is inadmissi-
ble (e.9., because it was obtained through oppression or it is unreliable) cannot be
rendered admissible simply because it is contained in a business document. Fi-
nally, another exclusionary rule concerns s. 78 of Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984, which gives a general discretion to the English courts to exclude evi-
dence that has an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. The discre-
tion is used very often and its scope is wide and there is no significant limitation
in its application, which makes it an "all purposes" discretion.
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6. It is first sought to see how the nemo-
tenetur principle may function in the area of the regulation of English financial
services where no sharp distinction is made between administrative supervision
and criminal investigation. It is argued that the operation of the nemo-tenetur
principle in England depends on factors other than a distinction between super-
vision and investigation. For example companies in England have a minimum
protection against self,incrimination. The same may be said also for the Nether-
lands. However, it is hard to imagine how this problem has anything to do with a
distinction between supervision and investigation. Furthermore, in situations
where the FSA may compel a suspect to provide oral information, the proper
functioning of the nemo-tentur principle will depend on the degree of compulsion
that the suspect faces. Also in situations where the FSA seeks to compel a suspect
to provide documentary information, the proper operation of the nemo-tenetur
principle will depend on whether a (punitive) sanction is imposed for not provid-
ing the documents, on the nature of that sanction and on the way that that sanc-
tion is used as a means of compulsion. Moreover, another factor which plays a
role in such situations is whether the FSA is at least aware of the existence of the
documents that it is trying to obtain compulsorily. The same situations may oc-
cur in the Netherlands where the same factors will play a role in the operation of
the nemo-tenetur prLnciple. These factors have once again nothing to do with a
distinction between supervision and investigation. The proper functioning of the
nemo-tentur principle during an FSA's non-criminal incluiry depends also on
factors not related to the lack of a distinction between supervision and investiga-
tion. The use of compulsory information gathering powers during such an in-
quiry does not pose a threat to the immunities of Article 6 ECHR if those powers
are used with the purpose to ascertain and record facts. However, compulsory
information gathering powers may be capable of infringing the nemo-tenetur
principle if they are used to gather information with the purpose of using it as
evidence in a later criminal trial and not simply recording facts. The use in trial
proceedings of compelled information obtained from the FSA, during a non-
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criminal inquiry, against the person who provided it may pose a threat to the
nenxo-tenetur p inciple, if the information concerned does not have an existence
independent from the will of the accused person. Once again, the same situations
may occur in the Netherlands where the same factors will play a role in the opera-
tion of the nerno-tenetur principle. Thus, the main conclusion of this thesis is that
the Dutch distinction between supervision and investigation does not have any
influence on the proper functioning of the nemo-tenetui principle. The operation
9f the nemo-tenetur principle depends on factors which hive nothing to do with adistinction between supervision and investigation. Therefore, it is not necessary




Het onderwerp van dit
toezicht, de strafrechtel
punt geldt het ondersch
Nederlandse wetgeving








Is het noodzakelijk een s,
einde het nemo-tenetur be
Deze vraag wordt beha
inleiding in hoofclstuk r
hoe het nemo-tenetur be
landse onderscheid" onr
Hoofdsruk z beschri
controle in Nederland. I
beschrijven maar om de
de vraagstelling verder
hoofclstuk z aan de ord
sprong van het ondersct
verhouding tussen het s
los van elkaar hebben o
gebieden van publiekre,
gevolgen van deze afual
controle en opsporing.
naar Nederlands recht al
feit is begaan. Wat aan
strafvordering en wordt
r97o is de Nederlandse
ten grondslag gaan legge
met handhaving van de
de opsporingstaak worde
betrokken ambtenaren I
gekoppeld zijn aan de cc
scheiden. Echter, het on<
